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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

j

FLOYD EUGENE MAESTAS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No, 900443-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from judgments entered upon jury
verdicts convicting Appellant Floyd Eugene Maestas of burglary of
a dwelling, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-6-202 (1990), and theft under $100, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990).

Jurisdiction of

the Utah Court of Appeals over the appeal is based on Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that

Defendant was not denied his statutory right to a speedy trial?
Was Defendant denied the speedy trial guaranteed by the federal
constitution?

Is Defendant's legal argument and analysis on this

issue adequate to obtain this court's ruling on the
constitutional issue?
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that there

was no Fourth Amendment violation requiring suppression of a

piece of glass taken from Defendant's pocket during booking for a
warrantless arrest for parole violation, where the arrest was
made at his girlfriend's home by parole officers who did not
enter the home?

Did the affidavits supporting warrants to seize

a sample of Defendant's blood and his belongings in the custody
of the police contain any false statement?

Even if so, was it

material to the issuing magistrates' determinations of probable
cause?
3.

Was Jury Instruction 13, concerning the State's

burden of proof and the definition of reasonable doubt, a correct
statement of the law?
4.

Did the trial court violate Defendant's due process

rights by refusing to allow his girlfriend to testify whether and
at what time Defendant had left her home on the afternoon of the
crimes?

Should the court even reach the merits of this

constitutional claim where Defendant made no proffer of what the
excluded testimony would have been and did not raise the due
process issue in the trial court?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant does not contend that any of the factual
findings underlying the trial court's legal conclusions were
clearly erroneous.

The issues raised on appeal present questions

of law, which this court reviews for correctness with no
deference to the trial court.

State v. Wilcox, 153 Utah Adv.

Rep. 7, 8 (Utah 1991).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies are included in the body of this brief or in the addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
General Facts re Burglary:
Sylvia Demetropolos, Phyllis Demetropolos, and Helen
Demetropolos returned home from church at approximately 7:00 p.m.
on August 21, 1989 (R. 178 at 74). They pulled into their
driveway, parked the car and went to the back door of their home,
where they found glass broken out of the window in the top half
of the back door and a large rock by the door (R. 178 at 76).
The three sisters entered the house at 1486 South Main Street and
found blood spattered on the walls of the hallway and kitchen (R.
178 at 106), broken glass scattered around the enclosed rear
porch and in the kitchen, food and liquor that had been removed
from the cupboards and placed on the counter in a bloodied
plastic bag, a large bloodied piece of broken window glass on the
kitchen counter, a can of beer in the dining room, and the
contents of dresser drawers and closets scattered around the
bedroom (R. 178 at 78-79; 201; 286). Phyliss called 911 to
report the breaking and entry (R. 178 at 204). Then Helen
Demetropolos hollered "There he goes" when she saw a shadowy
figure at the back of the house, silhouetted by the sun coming
through the west window; she pursued the man out the back door,
up the driveway and to the neighbor's house (T. 178 at 288; 290).
She never saw his face head on, only the back of his head (R. 178
at 291). Sylvia ran toward the telephone at the front door,
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turned and, along with Phyliss, saw a man go out the back door
and run up the driveway (R. 178 at 80-81; 204; 287). Phyliss ran
to the front door, opened it, and started chasing the man down
the street, yelling to two men across the street that they had
been burglarized (R. 178 at 205). The men joined her in chasing
the man for a ways, although she only got within 35 or 40 feet of
him (R. 178 at 205-06).

In the meantime, Sylvia had followed her

sister out the front door and watched the man run down the street
until she lost sight of him about four houses away (R. 178 at
84).

When the police arrived shortly thereafter, Sylvia

described the intruder as being of taller than medium build,
wearing a striped shirt and blue pants (R. 178 at 86).
Fariborz Khedmati, one of the two men responding to
Phyliss's hollering of "Stop thief," pursued the man fleeing
northward from her on Main Street, at one point coming within
several feet of him (R. 178 at 125-26).
"What did you steal?"

Khedmati asked the man,

The man, who was a Hispanic with a small

mustache wearing blue jeans and a blue and white shirt (R. 178 at
137), turned around and began walking backwards facing Khedmati
and his boss, who kept following.

The man said he had stolen

nothing and told the two pursuers to leave him alone because he
had a knife in his pocket (R. 178 at 128). Khedmati crossed the
street to call the police and left his boss to pursue the man (R.
178 at 126-28).

Khedmati identified Defendant as the man he had

pursued up Main Street in a photo spread a few days later and at
trial (R. 178 at 129-32).

He saw no other people on the street

besides Defendant, his boss and the Demetropolos sisters (T. 178
at 136).
-4-

Suppression Issues:

On August 21, 1989, Defendant Maestas was a

parolee required by the conditions of his parole to refrain from
consuming alcohol and to be at his residence, 436 Logan Avenue in
Salt Lake City, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
178 at 21-22).

(R.

His parole officer, Scott Carver, went to

Defendant's residence at approximately 10:30 p.m. to find out if
Defendant was in compliance with the curfew condition of his
parole (R. 178 at 23). He was informed by another resident at
that address that Defendant was not there and probably was at his
girlfriend's house (R. 178 at 23). After Carver learned from his
dispatcher that Defendant had not called in to provide a new
residence address or a reason for his curfew violation, Carver
and his partner, Agent Kevin Westover, went to the home of
Defendant's girlfriend, Linda Villagrana (R. 178 at 23). The two
agents approached the house on foot, and Carver sent Westover to
the back door of the house, which was straight down the driveway
(R. 178 at 24). Through the window, Carver saw Defendant running
to the back of the house and yelled to Westover, "He's coming out
your door."

(R. 178 at 24). As Defendant was opening the back

door, Westover ordered him to halt, which he did (R. 178 at 48).
Defendant came out of the house as directed to by Westover (R.
178 at 48-49), and was arrested for parole violation and
transported to jail for booking (R. 178 at 24).
At the jail, Carver noticed a recent cut with dried
blood on it on the palm of Defendant's hand after Defendant
complained of it (T. 178 at 175). During the search at the jail
incident to his arrest, the jailer removed a piece of glass with
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blood on it from Defendant's pocket and turned it over to
Westover (R. 178 at 25). The items on Defendant's person,
including his clothing and a gold chain with a cross with a white
stone on it, were placed in a sealed plastic bag and kept by the
jail.
On August 22 and again a few days later, Carver was
informed by two city police detectives that Defendant was a
suspect in a breaking and entering in which glass was broken (R.
178 at 26). The glass taken from defendant's pocket was turned
over to Detective Jensen (R. 178 at 26).
On August 23, Detective Jensen showed the Demetropolos
sisters a photo spread containing Defendant's picture, and none
of them could identify him as the man they had seen in their home
(R. 178 at 35). Fariborz Khedmati, who worked across the street
from the Demetropoloses, was also shown a photo spread by Jensen
that day and was able to pick out Defendant as the man he had
chased after and confronted (R. 178 at 126-29).
On August 28, before Circuit Court Judge Michael
Hutchings, Jensen executed an affidavit for a search warrant
(Def. Ex. 1; Addendum A) authorizing seizure of the clothing and
the gold chain taken from Defendant during his booking at the
jail for parole violation.

The affidavit contained the following

statement of facts to establish probable cause:
The statements of Phyliss Demetroplos,
and her sisters Sylvia and Helen Demetropolos
that on the night of 8/21/89 they went to
Phyliss's home at 14906 South Main Street.
They discovered the suspect in this case,
Floyd Maestas, inside the home and chased him
away. They found a window broken with drops
of blood. They found a sack of liquor

bottles and broken glass. They discovered
the house ransacked and a gold chain with a
cross containing a white stone missing. A
neighbor, witness, Fariborz Khedmati, also
saw Maestas and identified him from a photo
spread. This information was furnished by
victims to Officer Akin, SLCPD, whose report
# 89-87318 was furnished to your affiant and
used by him.
Later that evening Kevin Westover, A P&P,
found the defendant and arrested and booked
him on an unrelated Probation Violation.
When he was booked, a piece of bloody glass
was taken from the defendant's pockets, as
was a gold chain with a cross with a white
stone. This information given to your
affiant by Kevin Westover Ut State Department
of Corrections.
Wherefore, your affiant believes that the
suspect's clothing may be further bloodied
and the chain, cross and stone should be .
shown to the victim to see if it is the
stolen property since they can identify the
items taken from their house.
(Def.'s Ex. 1 at p. 2; Addendum A) (emphasis added).

After the

seized gold chain was identified as having been taken in the
burglary, Detective Jensen executed another affidavit for a
search warrant on September 7, seeking authorization to draw
Defendant's blood, with the following statement of supportive
facts:
The statements of Phyllis Demetropolis
and her sisters Sylvia and Helen Demetropolis
that on the night of 8/21/89 they went home
at 1496 South Main Street. They discovered
the suspect in this case, Floyd MAESTAS/
inside the home and chased him away. They
found a broken window with drops of blood on
the broken window pieces. The pieces of
broken glass were put into evidence. The
victims found the house ransacked and a gold
chain with a cross containing a white stone
missing. The cross has been seized from
Maestas and identified as the cross stolen
from the house.
Fariborz KHEDMATI also saw Floyd MAESTAS
and identified him in a photospread. This
information was furnished by victims to
-7-

officer AKIN, SLCPD, whose report number 8987318 was used by affiant. Affiant has also
interviewed victims and observed the
evidence.
Later that evening Kevin WESTOVER, A P&P,
found the defendant and arrested and booked
him on an unrelated probation violation.
When MAESTAS was booked a piece of glass with
blood on it was found in the defendant's
right front pocket. This information was
given to your affiant by Kevin WESTOVER, Utah
State Department of Corrections.
Wherefore your affiant believes the blood
on the glass found in the victim [sic]
residence and on the glass shard found in the
suspect's pocket to the suspect's blood.
(Def. Ex. 3; Addendum B) (emphasis added).
On April 11, 1990, Defendant filed a motion to suppress
the items taken from his person during his booking, claiming that
his warrantless arrest violated the fourth amendment (R. 57, 6168).

On April 23, he filed another motion to suppress,

contending that the seizure of his blood and his belongings at
the jail was unreasonable under the fourth amendment (R. 87).
Defendant contended that the warrants authorizing these two
seizures were issued on the basis of two affidavits containing
false information, i.e., the sentence emphasized above.
The suppression motions were heard by the trial court
on June 6, 1990 (R. 178 at 19-60).

At the suppression hearing,

Jensen testified that the sentence emphasized above in his
supporting affidavits was not intended to indicate that the
Demetropolos sisters had identified Maestas in the photo spread,
only to indicate that, at the time he executed the affidavits,
Defendant had been identified by Khedmati as the man seen running
from the Demetropolos home (R. 178 at 50-51).

-8-

The suppression

motions were taken under advisement and eventually denied (R. 98,
100).
Speedy Trial Issue:
Defendant grossly misstates the facts in this case by
representing to the court that "at no time did defendant, either
pro se or through his appointed lawyer, move the Court for a
continuance." (Brief of Appellant at 12).
Defendant was arrested and jailed for parole violation
on August 21, 1989 (R. 178 at 24). An information charging him
with burglary in this case was filed on or about September 12,
1989 (R. 7). Defendant appeared in circuit court for arraignment
without counsel on September 21, and counsel was appointed (R.
3).

Attorney Candice Johnson filed her appearance and a

discovery request on September 25 (R. 3, 27). Johnson appeared
before Judge Palmer on September 28 and a preliminary hearing was
set for October 5 (R. 3). On October 5, on Defendant's motion,
the case was continued and the preliminary hearing rescheduled
for October 26, apparently for the purpose of conducting a lineup requested by Defendant (R. 3). On October 16, Johnson filed a
motion to withdraw because of a conflict of interest (R. 13), and
Walter Bugden was appointed as counsel (R. 15). On October 26,
Bugden appeared before Judge Fuchs at the time set for the
preliminary hearing and requested another continuance in order to
have a line-up conducted (R. 3; 18). The preliminary hearing was
continued to November 9 (R. 3). On November 1, 1989, Defendant
filed a Request for Speedy Trial in the Circuit Court (R. 18-19).
After a preliminary hearing on November 9, Defendant was bound
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over and the case was transferred to district court on November
13, 1989 (R. 4). The record indicates that, at least until that
date, Defendant was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison for
parole violation having nothing to do with the charges in the
instant case (R. 4; 30; 51). It was not until December 8, 1989
that an order was issued committing him to the custody of the
county sheriff on the burglary charges (R. 32).

Meanwhile,

Defendant was arraigned in district court on November 24, at
which time Defendant appeared and pled not guilty; pretrial was
set for December 18 and trial for December 21 (R. 31; R. 179 at
3).
There is no explanation in the record on appeal for the
continuance of the December 21 trial date, although counsel for
the State represented to the trial court at a subsequent hearing
on the speedy trial issue that Defendant had recfuested a
continuance on December 21, 1989, and neither Defendant nor his
counsel at that point contradicted that representation (R. 178 at
10).
The next entry in the record of the district court is
Defendant's handwritten motion for withdrawal of Bugden as
counsel, filed on January 8, 1990, and based on conflict of
interest and ineffective assistance (R. 35). Those grounds are
expanded upon in Defendant's January 1, 1990 letter to Judge
Sawaya indicating Defendant's dissatisfaction with Bugden's
decision not to file some pretrial motions (R. 36). In another
letter filed February 12, 1990 (R. 37), Defendant again asked for
Bugden's dismissal as his appointed counsel.
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He also requested

an evidentiary hearing on his pro se suppression motion (R. 3941) and a continuance of the trial set for February 22, 1990 (R.
37-38).
In a minute entry dated February 16, Bugden was allowed
to withdraw as counsel (R. 45), and the public defender office
was directed to make arrangements for the next attorney on the
list to represent Defendant (R. 46). At the next hearing on
March 9, attorney Kenneth Brown appeared with Defendant (R. 178
at 1). Attorney Brown indicated he might be filing a formal
suppression motion (R. 178 at 1). Judge Sawaya struck
Defendant's improperly filed pro se motions and left Brown free
to file appropriate ones (R. 178 at 3; R. 48). Defendant voiced
no objection to this action, and at the end of the hearing
counsel engaged in the following discussion with the court:
Mr. Brown: I don't know if the Court wants
to set a trial date.
The Court: Not until you have completed your
pretrial motions.
Mr. Brown: Okay. Let's just—does the Court
want to set any kind of date today?
The Court: If you want to file additional
motions, you may do so. As soon as you do,
you will get a hearing as quickly as you file
them.
Mr. Brown:

All right.

(R. 178 at 5).
It was not until April 11, 1990 that Defendant's
counsel filed a Motion for Discovery pertaining to the out-ofcourt identifications of Defendant (R. 54-55), his first motion
to suppress (R. 57), and a Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss Based on Denial of Right to Speedy Trial (R. 49-50).

The

memorandum contained minimal legal analysis and no citations

to
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authorities, but requested dismissal because Defendant's rights
to a speedy trial and his Notice of Disposition were not
"scrupulously honored" (R. 49-50).

Attached to it were a copy of

prior counsel's November 1, 1989 Request for Speedy Trial (R. 5253) and a copy of a Notice of Disposition letter (R. 51) he
purportedly sent to the warden of the Utah State Prison on
October 30, 1989, demanding trial on the pending burglary charge
within the 120 days set by Utah Code Ann. § 77-2:9-1 (1990)
(Addendum C).
A one-sentence motion to dismiss based on the violation
of Defendant's rights to a speedy trial was fil€*d o.n April 12,
1990 (R. 69), as well as a memorandum in support of his first
suppression motion (R. 61-67).

A second motion to suppress and a

supporting memorandum were not filed until April 23, 1990 (R. 87;
71-86).
At a hearing held on May 4, 1990, Defendant's discovery
motion was addressed and granted (R. 178 at 14). Defendant's
speedy trial motion was also considered.

Defendant made no

mention of or argument based on the federal constitutional
guarantee of a right to a speedy trial or of the cases enforcing
it.

His sole contention was that he was entitled to dismissal of

the charges based on a violation of the 120-day limit (R. 9-10),
presumably that set forth in section 77-29-1.
Counsel for the State represented, while reviewing her
court file, that Defendant had requested the continuances granted
on October 5, October 26, and December 21, 1989, and on February
16, 1990 (R. 10). The court reviewed the aformentioned dates of
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counsels' appearances and Defendant's various hearings in the
circuit court and district court, as well as his pro se
suppression motions and requests for new counsel in January and
February 1990, and the March 9 first appearance of new counsel
(R. 178 at 11-13).

He then denied the motion to dismiss,

stating:
I don't think I can find on the state of this
record, that Mr. Maestas' rights to a speedy
trial have been violated, under these
circumstances. He's had two attorneys, both
of whom have had to withdraw for one reason
or another. You [referring to Mr. Brown]
have entered your appearance just shortly,
more than a month ago. I would find that his
right to a speedy trial has not been
violated, and his motion is denied.
(R. 178 at 13). The necessary evidentiary hearing on the
Defendant's two motions to suppress was then set; when the clerk
asked defense counsel about June 7, he responded, "June 7 would
be fine" (R. 178 at 17), and Defendant himself voiced no
objection to this setting.
Several days later, on May 14, 1990, Defendant filed a
stipulation for preparation of the line-up transcript so, as part
of trial preparation, counsel could make a determination of
whether to move to quash the identification or develop
exculpatory evidence (R. 178 at 94-95).
Hearing on the Defendant's suppression motions was held
on June 6, 1990 (R. 178 at 19-62), and they were taken under
advisement (R. 178 at 60). Defense counsel then requested a
trial date, and counsel for the State suggested late July or
August (R. 178 at 60-61).

The trial court then inquired of

defense counsel:
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THE COURT: Do you have any objection to
those dates?
MR* BROWN: Without waiving Mr. Maestas'
claim of speedy trial, I would certainly
be — no. I mean, I think he has articulated
that claim. We don't wish to detract from
that position as well.
THE COURT: Let's see what date we can find
and see if he has an objection.
THE CLERK: July 26th.
MR. BROWN:

Fine.

(R. 178 at 61). The trial actually commenced on July 25, 1990
(R. 178 at 63).
Reasonable Doubt Instruction:
The trial court declined to give Defendant's proposed
reasonable doubt instruction (R. 157), instead giving the
substance of it in Instruction 13 (R. 134; Addendum D).
Defendant's exception to Instruction 13 was based solely on his
belief that his proposed instruction more accurately reflected
the law because it very carefully "tracked" the dissent in State
v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), adopted by the majority of
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah
1989) (R. 341).
Exclusion of Certain Testimony of Defense Witness:
Defendant did not file a notice of intent to claim
alibi and a list of any alibi witnesses to the prosecution before
trial, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (1990).

At trial,

defense counsel previewed his client's defense for the jury by
explaining that the central issu€* in the case was "who entered
the house" (R. 178 at 69), that Defendant Maestas was not in the
burglarized home, and that he would be taking the stand to "bare
his soul" and explain to the jurors how he came into possession

-14-

of the stolen gold chain and cross and the bloody glass shard (R.
178 at 70).
The first defense witness was Linda Villagrana.

She

testified that on August 21, 1989, Defendant had come to her
house at 9:00 a.m., had taken her child to Raging Waters at 10:00
a.m. and had met her at the laundromat at noon, remaining with
her there until 3:00 p.m., when they returned to her house (R.
178 at 315). The following questioning ensued:
Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Okay. What happened
from — did Floyd ever leave your home? If
so, approximately when?
A. Well, I don't—
[PROSECUTOR]: I think before the question is
answered I would appreciate a bench
conference.
THE COURT: All right.
[Discussion off the record.]
Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Linda, directing
your attention to August 21, 1989 in
observing Mr. Maestas or Floyd, did you
observe what he was wearing on that day?
A. Goll, let me see. Blue jeans.
Q. Okay. Was he wearing a shirt?
A. I don't think he was.
Q. Okay. My understanding is that he came
back to your house later that evening; is
that correct, around 9:00 or 10:00, something
like that; is that correct?
A. No.
Q. When did he come back to your house?
A. It was—well, when it started getting
dark, about sometime around there.
(R« 178 at 315-16).

After brief further questioning, Villagrana

was excused and Defendant took the stand as the only other
defense witness (R. 178 at 318).
He testified concerning his actions the afternoon of
August 21, 1989:

just after 3:00 p.m., he had passed out at

Linda's house from drinking whiskey (R. 178 at 320); he awoke and
at about 6:30 p.m. went alone to a nearby convenience store,
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where he ran into an old friend who sold him the gold chain and
cross for $10.00 (R. 178 at 321-22); the two drank a few beers
and then started walking to a liquor store (R. 178 at 323); the
old friend and he stopped near 1496 South Main Street because the
former said he wanted to get some money at his sister's house (R.
178 at 324); Defendant waited outside for a few minutes, then
heard screaming from inside the house and saw his friend come
running out of the house and up Main Street (R. 178 at 325-26);
Defendant also ran up Main Street and was chased by Khedmati (R.
178 at 326). The piece of bloody glass taken from his pocket at
the jail was from a broken window in the back door at
Villagrana's house.

Defendant said he removed it the evening of

August 21 to prevent injury to children there, and in doing so
had cut himself (R. 178 at 327-28, 337). The defense rested at
the close of Maestas's testimony, and court adjourned for the day
(R. 178 at 336).
When court reconvened the next morning, Defendant moved
for a mistrial based on the court's exclusion oi: any response to
the question about whether, and at what time, Defendant had left
her home on the late afternoon of the crime (R. 178 at 337-38).
Defendant made no proffer concerning what Villagrana would have
testified to if she had been allowed to respond to the question.
Defendant did not contend that the court's ruling had resulted in
a violation of his due process rights.

Instead, defense counsel

argued that there was statutory good cause for failing to give
notice in accordance with section 77-14-2 (Addendum E) because he
had not met the witness until the day before trial (R. 178 at
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337-38).

In addition, counsel claimed that notice was excused

because the State knew of Villagrana's existence and had
subpoenaed her as a possible witness, and was therefore not
prejudiced by the lack of prior notice (R. 178 at 338). The
trial court denied the motion for mistrial, concluding that
Defendant was nonetheless required by the statute to give the
State notice of his intent to use Villagrana as an alibi witness
(R. 178 at 339).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
dismiss based on section 77-29-1 because there was good cause for
the delays in bringing him to trial.

Defendant was not denied

his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the four-part
test set forth in State v. Trafnyy 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990), in
light of his own responsibility for, or acquiescence in, the
trial delay and his failure to demonstrate any prejudice.
No arrest warrant was required by Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980), for the parole violation committed in the
presence of defendant's parole officers because no entry of the
home took place.

The affidavits supporting the search warrants

did not contain an intentionally or recklessly false statement.
Even if the statement is considered recklessly false or
misleading, the remaining information in the affidavits is
sufficient to support probable cause.
The trial court did not give an erroneous instruction
on the State's burden of proof and the meaning of reasonable
doubt in that context.

Instruction 13 is a duplicate of the
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reasonable doubt instruction recently approved of by this court
as a correct statement of the law on these points.
The court should decline to reach Defendant's due
process claim relating to the exclusion of Villagrana's response
to one question either because the constitutional issue was not
properly preserved below with a proffer of what the excluded
testimony would have been, or because the constitutional issue is
being raised on appeal for the first time.

Defendant has not

argued that this case involves any circumstances that would
justify his failure to raise this constitutional issue in the
trial court.
If the court addresses the issue on the merits,
Defendant has not demonstrated that he was in fact denied due
process by the trial court's ruling.

There is nothing in the

record to show what the witness's actual testimony would have
been if allowed to answer the question.

The trial court's

ruling, imposing a sanction for failure to comply with the
notice-of-alibi statute, did not hamper or eliminate Defendant's
presentation of his defense, i.e., that he did not enter the
burglarized residence.

In light of the other evidence

contradicting the defendant's testimony that he was not in the
Demetropolos home on August 21, the one item of potential
corroboration excluded by the court's ruling was not critical to
the defense.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE TRIAL
COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS BASED ON SECTION 77-29-1(4) BECAUSE
DEFENDANT DOES NOT ASSERT OR DEMONSTRATE THAT
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF GOOD CAUSE
WAS ERRONEOUS OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1990) entitles an
incarcerated person against whom criminal charges are pending to
a trial on those charges within 120 days of delivery of written
notice of a demand for disposition of those charges.

Subsection

(2) authorizes the granting of reaonable continuances to either
the charged defendant or to the prosecuting attorney.

Section

77-29-1(4) provides:
In the event the charge is not brought to
trial within 120 days or within such
continuance as has been granted, and
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the
action, the court shall review the
proceeding. If the court finds that the
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have
the matter heard within the time required is
not supported by good cause, whether a
previous motion for continuance was made or
not, the court shall order the matter
dismissed.
In this case, if we assume that Attorney Budgen's
Notice of Disposition letter was in fact delivered to the Warden
on November 1, 1989, the original trial setting of December 21.
1989 was well within the 120-day period commenced by that
delivery.

See State v. Moore, 521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974).

Defendant requested a continuance of that trial date (R. 178 at
10) and the trial was reset for February 22, 1990, still within
the original 120 days from November 1.
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His second attorney,

Bugden, was allowed to withdraw on February 16, after Defendant
requested new counsel, a suppression hearing, and a trial
continuance in his January and early February 1990 pro se motions
and correspondence (R. 37-38).
The motion to dismiss under the statute was not even
filed until April 12. At the hearing on that motion, the trial
court determined that Defendant's action in seeking continuances
and new counsel, approximately two weeks before expiration of the
original 120-day period, constituted good cause under section 7729-1(4) for the prosecuting attorney's failure to bring Defendant
to trial within that period.
Defendant asserts that no good cause was shown in this
case (Brief of Appellant at 12), but does not claim any abuse of
discretion in the trial court's good cause determinatinon and
ignores relevant legal authority contrary to his claim.
e.g.,

See

State v. Valasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982) (statutory

period is extended by amount of time during which defendant was
cause of delay); State v. Carlsenf 25 Utah 2d 136, 478 P.2d 326
(1970) (successive appointments of counsel at defendant's request
sufficient for good cause).

The court should therefore reject

Defendant's statutory claim and affirm the trial court's denial
of his section 77-29-1(4) motion to dismiss.
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POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REACH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIM BECAUSE
DEFENDANT'S SCANT ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION
OF THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL TEST TO THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE IS INADEQUATE TO PRESENT THE ISSUE
FOR THE APPELLATE COURT'S DISPOSITION.
Defendant asserts on appeal that his federal
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, focusing on
the delay between his arrest on charges unrelated to this
prosecution (Brief af Appellant at 11). He then lists the four
factors from the applicable balancing test taken from Barker v.
Winqo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), baldly asserts that three of the
factors are shown here, without addressing the application of the
Barker test to the actual facts and proceedings in this case, and
asks this court to find a constitutional violation based on his
fifteen sentences of "legal analysis" (Brief of Appellant at 1314).
This court should refuse the invitation to make a
constitutional ruling on the basis of such incomplete briefing,
analysis, and argument.

See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,

1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 69 (Ct.
App. 199).
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POINT III
UNDER THE APPLICABLE BALANCING TEST,
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, WHERE
THE DELAY WAS EITHER AT HIS REQUEST OR WITH
HIS CONSENT OR ACQUIESCENCE, HE ASSERTED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
ONLY ONCE, AND NO PREJUDICE HAS BEEN SHOWN.
Under Barker/ four factors should be considered in
evaluating whether the speedy trial right

has been denied:

the

length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.

State v.

Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1990); State v. Hoyt, 153 Utah
Adv. Rep. 16, 17 (Ct. App. 1991).
An arrest warrant was issued for Defendant on
September 12, 1989 (R. 6), and trial began on July 25, 1990.
There is no question that this 316-day period is considerable,
but it is still within the range of delays that have nonetheless
passed constitutional muster.

See State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d at

708 n.16 (citing various cases with delays ranging from 3h months
to 4*$ years).
Turning to the reasons for the delay, the record shows
that long segments were the result of actions taken by Defendant,
during which he must be held to have temporarily waived his
speedy trial right.

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1329030

(Utah 1986); Hoyt, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17; ^ee Trafny, 799 P.2d
at 708 n.15.

The 42-day period between September 28, on which

The right is designed to protect three interests: prevention
of oppressive pretrial detention; minimization of anxiety and
concern of the accused; and limitation of the possibility that
the defense will be impaired. Barker v. Wingof 407 U.S. at 532;
State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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preliminary hearing was set for October 5, and November 9, the
date on which the preliminary hearing finally took place should
not weigh against the State.

Defendant requested a continuance

on October 5 in order to conduct a line-up, a process interrupted
by a change of counsel by Defendant, and the line-up did not
occur until November 9.

In the November 1 Request for Speedy

Trial (R. 18-19), even defense counsel acknowledged that
Defendant had temporarily waived his speedy trial right up to
that point by demanding a line-up prior to the preliminary
hearing in circuit court, after which he was bound over, on
November 13, and arraigned, on November 24. At the latter, trial
was set for December 21. The record reveals no reason for this
segment of delay.
Defendant obtained a continuance of the trial date on
December 21 until February 22, 1990, another 63 days of delay
attributable to Defendant and not to the State.

The 15-day delay

from February 22 until March 9, the result of Defendant's request
for new counsel and for a continuance of trial pending hearing on
his suppression motions, as well as the 89-day period from March
9 until June 6, during which Defendant agreed to postpone trial
until after disposition of his potentially dispositive pre-trial
motions (regarding suppression and an alleged statutory speedy
trial violation) also should not not be used against the State in
applying the Barker balancing test.

See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 707

(delays from defendant's motions cannot be counted against
State).
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At the June 6 hearing when Defendant requested a trial
date, it was set for July 25. That setting was delayed by
approximately one month because the prosecutor was already
scheduled for ten trials in the balance of June and early July
(R. 178 at 60-61).
The only affirmative assertion by Defendant of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial appears in the record in
his November 1, 1989 Request for Speedy Trial (R. 18-19).

At all

other times, Defendant did not raise the issue when hearing dates
were scheduled, but instead explicitly agreed to the scheduling
of proceedings, did not act expeditiously in filing or getting to
hearing his potentially dispositive pretrial motions, and never
sought a dismissal of the charges against him on the grounds that
delay had violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial
under the Barker standard.

"While Barker made it clear that a

defendant cannot waive his right to a speedy trial by failing to
demand it, the factors underlying that failure must be figured
into the balance."

State v. Miller, 747 P.2d at 443 (quoting

State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah 1987)).
Finally, Defendant does not attempt to show any
prejudice to him from the delay between his arrest and trial, and
o
the record suggests none.

The record indicates that Defendant was incarcerated due to the
parole violation from August 21, 1989 until at least November 13,
1989, but does not reveal whether Defendant was ever in State
custody as a result of the charges against him in the instant
case.
-9A_

In light of these facts, and in light of the
appropriate factors to be balanced, no denial of Defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy trial occurred.
POINT IV
NO WARRANT WAS REQUIRED FOR DEFENDANT'S
ARREST FOR PAROLE VIOLATION UNDER THE RULE OF
PAYTON V, NEW YORK BECAUSE THE OFFICERS DID
NOT ENTER THE HOME TO ARREST HIM.
Defendant claims that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by his warrantless arrest for parole violation at
Villagrana's home, relying on the Payton v. New York# 445 U.S.
573 (1980).

Under Payton, the police may not make a warrantless,

consentless entry into a private residence to make a routine
(i.e., nonexigent) felony arrest even if they could have made
such a warrantless arrest without entering the residence.
However, this rule has no application on the facts of this case.
Defendant contended in the trial court that "under
Payton there is a requirement to obtain an arrest warrant before
you actually enter the dwelling to arrest the individual[•]"

(R.

178 at 16). However, as the prosecution contended in the trial
court (R. 178 at 16), and as even Defendant seems to recognize on
appeal (Brief of Appellant at 7, 16), the parole officers
indisputably did not enter the Villagrana home.

Defendant was

confronted by the officers after he had run from the front to the
back of the house and had opened the rear door.

Defendant came

out of the house at Agent Westover's direction and was arrested
outside the home.

(R. 178 at 24, 48-49).

As the Court in Payton reiterated, physical entry of a
person's home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
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fourth amendment is directed.

j[d. at 585; accord State v.

Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Because the

fourth amendment is designed to prevent instrusions into the
privacy of one's home, warrantless seizures of a suspect inside a
home are presumptively unreasonable.

Paytonf 445 U.S. at 586.

But, as the Court pointed out, "the Fourth Amendment has drawn a
firm line at the entrance to the house.

Absent exigent

circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably by crossed
without a warrant."

^d. at 590.

Where, as in the instant case, the threshold is not
crossed, there is no violation of the sanctity of the home, and
no warrant is required in order to render the airrest reasonable
under the fourth amendment.

Defendant was thus validly arrested

for parole violation even though no arrest warrant was obtained,
and the trial court correctly denied the first motion to suppress
3
items seized incident to that arrest.

3
There are other serious problems with Defendant's fourth
amendment claim. For instance, even if there had been entry by
the parole officers to arrest him, the record does not disclose a
basis for Defendant's standing to assert any privacy interest in
Villagrana's home. More importantly, even if he had established
his standing, police need not obtain a warrant to enter a
parolee's home to effectuate an arrest if there is reasonable
cause to believe there has been a parole violation. United
States v, Cardona, 903 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1990) (following Griffin
v. Illinois, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)).
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POINT V
THE AFFIDAVITS SUPPORTING THE SEIZURE OF THE
ITEMS TAKEN FROM DEFENDANT'S PERSON AT
BOOKING AND OF HIS BLOOD SAMPLE DID NOT
CONTAIN A FALSE REPRESENTATION; EVEN IF THIS
COURT DETERMINED OTHERWISE, THE AFFIDAVITS
CONTAINED AMPLE SUPPORT FOR A FINDING OF
PROBABLE CAUSE IF THE ERRONEOUS MATERIAL IS
EXCISED,
Defendant next challenges the validity of the warrants
authorizing seizure of his blood sample, and the clothing and
gold chain held by the jail as his personal property after
booking•

First, he claims, the statement by the affiant officer

in the supporting affidavits (Addendum A and B, quoted in full in
Appellee's Statement of Facts, supra) that "They [i.e., the
Demetropolos sisters] discovered the suspect in this case, Floyd
Maestas, inside the home and chased him away" is false.

Second,

if this false statement is taken out of the afffidavits,
Defendant avers, the affidavit is "devoid" of probable cause.
(Brief of Appellant at 17).
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), the
United States Supreme Court held that if a defendant shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that an affiant made an
intentionally or recklessly false statement to obtain a warrant,
the false material must be excised from the affidavit and
probable cause determined on the basis of the remaining content.
If the remaining content is insufficient to establish probable
cause, the warrant is invalid.

Id.; State v. Brown, 798 P.2d

284, 288 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

As formulated by the Utah Supreme

Court, if an omission or misstatement materially affects the
finding of probable cause, any evidence obtained pursuant to the
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warrant must be suppressed.

State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191

(Utah 1986).
As the prosecution argued to the trial court (R. 178 at
59), the statement challenged as false by Defendant can
reasonably be read in the context of the entire statement of
supportive facts as a naming of the suspect as Floyd Maestas by
the affiant for the benefit of the reviewing judge, not as an
erroneous indication to the judge that the Demetropolos sisters
had identified Maestas as the man they discovered in and chased
from their home.

Significantly, Jensen did not state that the

women had "identified" the man in their home as Maestas, which
would have undeniably conveyed the false message that they had
seen a man in their home whom they had later identified as being
Maestas.
The other reasonable reading of the sentence under
attack is that which Jensen testified he intended to convey,
namely, that the suspect chased away from the Demetropolos home
had, by the time the affidavits were executed, been identified by
someone as Maestas.

This is a true statement since, as Jensen

stated a few sentences later in the affidavits, Khedmati had
identified Maestas in the photo spread on August 23, 1989 (R. 178
at 50-51).

Thus, although the sentence could have been drafted

in other ways to be clearer about its intended message, the trial
court could properly find that Jensen had not made a false
statement in the affidavits intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly.
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Even if this court were to conclude otherwise from the
face of the affidavits, it is clear that the affidavits contain
ample support for a determination of probable cause if the
misleading naming of Maestas as the suspect was taken out, so
that the challenged sentence read:
the home and chased him away."

"They discovered a man inside

Thus, any false information

conveyed in the challenged sentence did not materially affect the
determination of probable cause.

Defendant does not make any

attempt to demonstrate the contrary.

"The obvious purpose of

Franks and its progeny is to avoid suppressing evidence when the
actual facts, if known to the magistrate, would have resulted in
a finding of probable cause."

Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191.

Therefore, on either of these two bases, this court
should conclude that the search warrants were valid and that the
trial court thus correctly denied Defendant's second motion to
suppress.
POINT VI
THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION GIVEN TO THE
JURY IS IDENTICAL TO THAT RECENTLY UPHELD BY
THIS COURT IN STATE V, PEDERSEN AS A CORRECT
STATEMENT OF THE LAW.
Defendant claimed in the trial court (R. 178 at 341)
and in his brief on appeal (Brief of Appellant at p. 18) that the
trial court committed reversible error by giving Instruction 13
(Addendum C) instead of the reasonable doubt instruction he
proposed.

He does not point to any particular errors or

omissions in the instruction given, but claims that his own
proposed instruction better "tracks" current case law on the
subject, specifically, State v. Ireland,, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82
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(Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting), and State v. Johnsonf 774
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989).
However, three weeks before Appellant's brief was
filed, this court issued State v. Pedersen, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10
(Ct. App. 1990), which involved a similar challenge to an
identical reasonable doubt instruction,

iji. at 12; cf.

Instruction 13 at R. 134 (Addendum D to Appellee's Brief).

The

court held that the instruction given was a correct statement of
law that complied with the requirements enunciated in Johnson and
Ireland.

Pedersen, 150 Utah Adv, Rep. at 12.

Louisianna#

U.S.

Cf. Cage v.

, 111 S.Ct. 328 (1990) (invalidating

instruction equating reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty"
and "actual substantial doubt").

Therefore, the trial court did

not err in giving that instruction to the jury, even if the
reasonable doubt instruction proposed by defendant but not given
was also proper.

Jd.

For the same reasons, this court should

reject the claim that the trial court in the instant case erred
in giving Instruction 13.
POINT VII
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS CLAIM BECAUSE HE
WAIVED IT BY NOT RAISING IT FIRST IN THE
TRIAL COURT.
On appeal, Defendant asserts that his conviction should
4
be reversed because he was denied his due process right to
4
Although Defendant alludes on appeal to a due process right
under the Utah Constitution, he makes no argument on state
constitutional grounds and suggests no analysis distinct from
that applicable to the federal due process provision. The State
therefore addresses only the federal constitutional claim. See
State v. Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
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present a defense when the trial court refused to allow Linda
Villagrana to say whether and when he had left her home on the
late afternoon of the crime (Brief of Appellant at p. 18).
Defendant made no such contention in the trial court, either
during or after trial.

He also does not contend that the trial

court's evidentiary ruling constitutes plain error, or that a
liberty interest is at stake and there are exceptional
circumstances justifying his failure to present his
constitutional claim first to the trial court for its
determination.

See State v. Jameson, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 3

(1990); State v. Harrison, 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct. App. 1991).
Because he did not present any due process claim first to the
trial court, Defendant should be deemed to have waived this
constitutional claim and the court should not reach the merits of
the issue.

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985).
POINT VIII

THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REACH THE MERITS
OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAIM BECAUSE THE
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROFFER ON THE TRIAL
RECORD THE CONTENT OF THE EXCLUDED TESTIMONY
MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE APPELLATE COURT
TO DETERMINE AS A PRELIMINARY MATTER WHETHER
IT WAS ACTUALLY CORROBORATIVE OF A PORTION OF
HIS DEFENSE.
At the outset, it should be noted that Defendant does
not contend that the notice of alibi statute, Utah Code Ann.
S 77-14-2 (1990) (Addendum E), is unconstitutional on its face.
4

4

Cont.
Cont. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 n.l (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
5
Notice-of-alibi statutes have withstood facial challenges on
due process grounds where, like section 77-14-2(3), they do not
prevent a noncomplying Defendant from testifying in support of
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Nor does he contend that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to find that Defendant had established good cause for
his failure to comply with the statute.

Instead, Defendant

merely asserts he was denied due process because the trial
court's evidentiary ruling prevented him from presenting a
defense, without demonstrating how his defense was impaired when
Linda Villagrana was not allowed to answer one question about
whether and when Defendant had left her company the afternoon of
the burglary.
Defendant made no proffer concerning what Jillagrana's
response to either part of the question would have been.

He now

claims that the trial court committed reversible error in
excluding this testimony, whatever it may have been.

Under Rule

103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, a party cannot challenge as
erroneous a trial court's ruling excluding evidence unless "the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or
was apparent from the context within which questions were asked."
This requirement is essential to the appellate process.

Only if

the substance of the excluded evidence appears in the record can
the appellate court determine first, whether the ruling was
erroneous, and second, if the error was harmful.

See State v.

Cont.
Cont. his own alibi defense, Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 81-82 and 1908 (1970), and if they evenhandedly require
the State to disclose its alibi rebuttal witnesses, Wardius v.
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); see generally Annotation, "Validity
and Construction of Statute Requiring Defendant in Criminal Case
to Disclose Matter as to Alibi Defense," 45 A.L.R.3d 958 (1972).
6

Cf. State v. Bias, 393 So.2d 677 (La. 1981).
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Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1986); see also Bradford v.
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1980).
As discussed in full below, Defendant's due process
claim can only succeed on the merits if he can show that the
excluded testimony was vital to his defense because of its
exculpatory, corroborative, or other favorable nature.

However,

the court has no way of knowing what the content of the excluded
testimony would have been.

Asked if and when defendant left her

house, it is completely plausible that Villagrana would have
finished her interrupted response, "Well, I don't . . . " (R. 178
at 315) with the word "know," completely vitiating any claim by
Defendant that the trial court excluded testimony favorable to
the defense.

For this reason alone, the court should decline to

reach the merits of Defendant's due process claim.

See

Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 404 Mass. 61, 533 N.E.2d 638, 640
(1989).
POINT IX
IF THE COURT NONETHELESS REACHES THE MERITS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, THERE WAS NO
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS RESULTING FROM THE
EVIDENTIARY RULING ENFORCING THE NOTICE-OFALIBI STATUTE SANCTION BECAUSE: (1) THE
EXCLUDED TESTIMONY WAS OTHERWISE PRESENTED TO
THE JURY; AND (2) EVEN IF THE COURT ASSUMES
THE EXCLUDED TESTIMONY WAS FAVORABLE TO
DEFENDANT, IT WAS NOT CRITICAL TO THE DEFENSE
PRESENTED
Although Defendant made no record proffer of whether
Villagrana would have testified that Defendant did leave her home
the late afternoon of the burglarly, a subsequent question
directed to her by counsel suggested that Villagrana's testimony
would have been that Defendant had in fact left:
-33-

Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] Okay. My
understanding is that he came back to your
house later that evening; is that correct,
around 9:00 or 10:00, something like that; is
that correct?
A. No.
Q. When did he come back to your house?
A. It was—well, when it started getting
dark, about sometime around there.
(R. 178 at 316). Thus, the only testimony actually excluded by
the trial court for noncompliance with section 77-14-2's
requirements concerned what time Defendant had left Villagrana's
7
home.
This information was provided to the jury through
Defendant's own subsequent testimony that he left her house at
approximately 6:30 p.m. and went to a convenience store (R. 178
at 321). Since the information sought from Villagrana but
excluded was nonetheless presented to the jury, it is difficult
to see how the trial court's ruling could have had anything but a
negligible effect on the presentation of the defense.

See State

v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1202 (Utah 1984).
Defendant's entire due process argument consists of a
description of three distinguishable United States Supreme Court
cases, all involving the application of a per se state statute or
rule to exclude evidence that was clearly exculpatory or
otherwise material and favorable to the defense put forth at

The prosecution put on no direct evidence of the time at which
the Demetropolos house was broken into. On cross-examination,
Sylvia Demetropolos indicated that a neighbor had told her of
hearing breaking glass around 5:00-5:30 p.m. on August 21 (R. 178
at 117), but the neighbor was not called as a witness by either
party.
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trial.

In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967), the

Court held that the sixth amendment right to compulsory process
was violated by a state law absolutely prohibiting a convicted
accomplice from testifying on behalf of a co-accomplice.
Washington was accused of murder.

His defense was that his

accomplice, Fuller, had taken a gun from him and fired it at the
victim, after Washington unsuccessfully had tried to prevent the
shooting.

Washington testified to this version of the shooting

episode, but the trial court refused, pursuant to state law, to
9
allow him to call Fuller to corroborate his story.
Pointing out
that Fuller was the only person besides Washington who knew what
had happened, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
Washington's due process rights were violated by the statute's
absolute bar to Fuller's testimony, which the Court characterized
as relevant, material and vital to the defense.

Id.

A few years later, the Court again reversed a murder
conviction on due process grounds where the trial court had
barred the defendant from (a) cross-examining his own witness,
McDonald, about the witness's repudiation of a confession to the
o

Defendant's thin "argument" on his due process claim, Brief of
Appellant at 18-21, contains completely inadequate legal and
factual analysis, providing the court with an additional reason
for not reaching the merits of the constitutional issue. See
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
g
The Court did not have to speculate about what Fuller would
have said if allowed to testify:
The record indicated that Fuller would have
testified that [Washington] pulled at him and
tried to persuade him to leave, and that
[Washington] ran before Fuller fired the
fatal shot.
Washington# 388 U.S. at 23.
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murder, applying the voucher rule that prohibits crossexamination of your own witness unless adverse, or (b)
introducing testimony from three other witnesses to whom McDonald
had separately admitted shooting the victim, applying the rule
against admission of hearsay.
284, 294 (1973).

Chambers v. Mississippif 410 U.S.

Because this testimony was critical to

Chambers' defense that McDonald, not he, had shot the victim, id.
at 289, 302, his conviction was reversed.

Notwithstanding this

result, the Court was careful to point out that even the
important right of a criminal defendant to call and cross-examine
witnesses may have to bend to the legitimate interests of the
State in the criminal trial process:
Few rights are more fundamental than
that of an accused to present witnesses in
his own defense. In the exercise of this
right, the accused, as is required of the
State, must comply with established rales of
procedure and evidence designed to assure
both fairness and reliability in the
ascertainment of guilt and innocence.
Id. at 302 (citations omitted).
Finally, in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), a
divided Court reversed the manslaughter conviction of a woman who
was herself barred by a per se state rule from testifying to the
events leading up to the shooting of her husband during a
domestic dispute because her recollection of them had been
hypnotically refreshed.

The defendant and the dead victim were

As in Washington/ 388 U.S. at 23, and Chambers, 410 U.S. at
287-88, 292-93, but unlike the instant case, the content of the
excluded testimony was made a part of the record in Rock, 483
U.S. at 48 n.4.
-36-

the only ones present during the incident.

After hypnosis, she

remembered that she had held the gun to protect herself but never
pulled the trigger and that the defective gun had discharged when
her husband grabbed her arm.

The Court recognized Rock's right

to testify in her own behalf, jud. at 49, and held that the sixth
amendment gives a defendant the right to call all witnesses whose
testimony is "material and favorable to his defense."

Id. at 52

(quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867
(1982)).
The circumstances of the instant case are, however,
like those presented in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108
S.Ct. 646 (1988), in which the Court rejected a defendant's
contention that he was denied the right to compulsory process,
and thus due process, when the trial court exercised the
discretion granted by a notice-of-alibi statute similar to our
own and excluded his proposed witness at his attempted murder
trial because of noncompliance with pretrial notice requirements.
The excluded testimony, which was presented to the trial court
outside the jury's presence for the admissibility ruling, was
that the witness had seen the victim's brother with a gun just
before the shooting.

This would have corroborated one item of

the defendant's version, testified to by two defense witnesses,
that the victim's brother, and not he, had fired the shots.

Id.,

108 S.Ct. at 650. On the other hand, several prosecution
witnesses had testified that the defendant had a gun, had shot
the victim in the back as he fled, and had pointed the gun at the
victim's head as he lay on the ground, but the gun had misfired.
Id., 108 S.Ct. at 649.
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In Taylor, the United States Supreme Court stressed
that notice-of-alibi rules enhance the fairness of the adversary
system by helping to insure that judgments are not founded on
partial or speculative factual presentations due to a party's
surprise at trial.

Ld., 108 S.Ct at 653 & n.l6«

The adversary process could not function
effectively without adherence to rules of
procedure that govern the orderly
presentation of facts and arguments to
provide each party with a fair opportunity to
assemble and and submit evidence to
contradict or explain the opponent's case.
. . . The State's interest in the orderly
conduct of a criminal trial is sufficient to
justify the imposition and enforcement of
firm, though not always inflexible, rales
relating to the identification and
presentation of evidence.
Id., 108 S.Ct. at 653.

The Stater's interest in protecting itself

from an "eleventh hour defense," previously described in Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970), as "both obvious and
legitimate," is only one component of the broader public interest
in full and truthful disclosure.

Id., 108 S.Ct. at 654.

Pretrial discovery of alibi witnesses minimizes the risk that a
judgment will be predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even
deliberately fabricated testimony.

Id., 108 S.Ct at 654 &

n. 1/.
The Court flatly rejected the argument, which seems to
be Defendant's position in this case, that no sanction excluding
a surprise alibi witness could be imposed consistent with the

The Court found it reasonable to presume that there is
"something suspect about a defense witness who is not identified
until after the eleventh hour has passed." Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at
655.
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sixth amendment's compulsory process clause, emphasizing that the
accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that
is inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.

][d., 108 S.Ct.

at 653,
Thus, in Washington, Chambers, and Rock, the Court
determined that the corroborative or exculpatory testimony the
defendants sought to introduce was so critical to the defense
that its exclusion resulted in a denial of the sixth amendment
right to compulsory process and a concomitant denial of due
process.

The corroborative testimony in Taylor, however, was not

considered critical.
The differing results can be harmonized if we focus on
the integrity of the factfinding process and examine the nature
of the testimony before the respective juries as well as that
kept from the juries by the trial courts' exclusionary rulings.
In Washington, the excluded testimony was the only direct
eyewitness evidence of how the killing occurred, other than that
from the defendant himself.

In Chambersf the excluded testimony

was the only evidence available to discredit McDonald's
repudiation of his prior confession that he was the one who fired
the fatal shots.

In Rock, the excluded hypnotically refreshed

testimony of the defendant was the only direct eyewitness
evidence.

The trial courts' evidentiary rulings left the

factfinders with either no direct evidence of who had committed
the crimes or only that of the eyewitness who was on trial.
Secondly, there is nothing to suggest in these three cases to
suggest that the prosecution was unaware of the proposed
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testimony before trial.

In contrast, in Taylor there were

several other available eyewitnesses to the shooting.

Despite

the exclusion of testimony by defendant's surprise alibi witness,
the factfinders had before them some eyewitness testimony that
defendant had actually shot the victim, as well as the
conflicting testimony of two defense witnesses that the victim's
brother, and not defendant Taylor, had been armed and had fired
the shots.

Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649.

More importantly, the excluded testimony in Washington,
Chambers , and Rock—if believed by the factfinders—would have
completely exonerated the defendants of the crimes charged.

The

excluded testimony in Taylor, however, even if believed by the
jury, would only have corroborated part of the defense's version
of what happened, i.e., that the victim's brother had been armed.
It would not have provided the only direct evidence of who had
fired the shots at the victim.

Two different versions of that

were already before the jury.
Similarly, in the instant case, the one item of
Villagrana testimony precluded by the trial court's challenged
evidentiary ruling—even if this court was willing to speculate
and assume that it was favorable to Defendant—would only have
corroborated Defendant's claim that he was in her home until
about 6:30 p.m.

It would have told the jury nothing about the

other critical portions of his defense, i.e., that he had not
entered the Demetropolos home and that the glass in his pocket
was from Villagrana's broken window.

Therefore, even if it had

been admitted and believed by the factfinder, Villagrana's
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testimony would not have compelled the conclusion that that
Defendant was innocent of the crime charged.
In accordance with section 77-14-2(3), application of
the notice-of-alibi statute to exclude Villagrana's response to
one narrow question about the time of Defendant's departure did
not prevent Defendant from testifying to the same as one small
part of his version of events.

His defense was that he was not

the person who entered the Demetropolos home and took the gold
chain and cross.

He explained his presence at the burglary scene

and his possession of the stolen gold chain and cross by relating
the following:

At 6:30 p.m., after waking up from passing out,

he went alone from Villagrana's house to a convenience store, ran
into a friend who sold him the gold chain cheap, drank some, then
accompanied this friend to the area of the Demetropolos home,
waited outside on the sidewalk for him to get some money from his
sister for more liquor, then heard screaming and shouting, saw
his friend run away down Main Street, and himself started running
down Main Street, pursued by the women and by two men from across
the street who were attracted by the commotion.

According to

Defendant, the bloodied glass in his pants pocket came from a
broken window at Villagrana's home.
There were, as in Taylor, other available eyewitnesses
to the criminal activity who provided differing direct evidence
concerning Defendant's presence in the Demetropolos home.

Sylvia

Demetropolos identified Defendant as the man she saw in her home
and watched running out of the house and down the street (R. 178
at 92). Khedmati also identified Defendant unequivocably as the
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man he chased away from the Demetropolos home (R. 178 at 131),
and none of the witnesses who saw the burglar and chased after
him saw any other man resembling Defendant and wearing similar
clothes who could have been the anonymous friend testified to by
Defendant.
In addition, the State's expert conducted two tests to
compare the density and refractive index of the piece of glass
taken from Defendant's pocket (State's Ex. 5) with those of a
large bloodied piece of broken window glass found on the kitchen
counter of the Demetropolos home (State's Ex. 6) and from the
broken window at Villagrana's home (State's Ex. 7). These tests
indicated that Exhibits 5 and 6 were consistent in density and
could have come from a common origin (R. 178 at 253, 255). On
the other hand, the same tests showed that Exhibit 5 and 7 had
different densities and different refractive indices, indicating
that the pieces of glass from Defendant's pocket and from
Villagrana's broken window did not share a common origin (R. 178
at 257-258).

Defendant did not present any contradictory expert

testimony.
Finally, a medical technologist expert in blood typings
conducted seven different tests on the blood taken from Defendant
(State's Ex. 10) and the blood on the large piece of broken glass
retrieved from the Demetropolos kitchen counter (State's Ex. 6).
Five of those tests showed the blood type of both blood samples—
found in only 11.36 percent of the population (R. 178 at 272) as
typed in one of the five tests and in only 3.3 percent of the
population as typed in another of the tests (R. 178 at 274)—to
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be consistent, while the other two tests were inconclusive (R.
178 at 271-72).

The expert testified that only .16 of the

population would have the five typings found in the blood drawn
from Defendant and that on the large piece of broken glass (R.
178 at 274). The two blood-typing tests that could be performed
on the small quantity of blood on the shard removed from
Defendant's pocket (State's Ex. 5) also showed consistent typing
with blood drawn from Defendant and that on the large piece of
glass found in the Demetropolos kitchen (R. 178 at 175).
In light of this uncontroverted evidence pointing to
Defendant as the person who broke into the Demetropolos home,
ransacked the house, took the gold chain, and fled upon
discovery, there is simply no basis for concluding that Defendant
was denied due process by the trial court's exclusion of what may
or may not have corroborated his version of the time he left her
I
household. Even if we assume that Villagrana, Defendant's
girlfriend and the custodian of his child (R. 178 at 328), would
have corroborated the part of his story in which he remained at
her house until 6:30 p.m., her testimony on this point would not
have constituted a material and vital part of his defense.
When the content of Defendant's actual defense is
examined, it becomes apparent that the exclusion of Villagrana's
possible "eleventh hour" testimony about what time he left her
home had no significant impact on Defendant's presentation of his
defense, and Defendant has pointed out none.

This court should

therefore conclude that Defendant's due process rights were not
violated by the trial court's evidentiary ruling sanctioning
Defendant for failure to comply with section 77-14-2.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests that this
court affirm the judgments of conviction.
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Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24j, the State wishes to
call the court's attention to the following pertinent authority,
which was inadvertently omitted from Point IX, page 37 at line 9
of the State's brief:
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275 (Utah
1985) (defendant claiming compulsory process
denial must show that the excluded testimony
was material, ie.f that there is a reasonable
probability that its conclusion would affect
the trial's outcome).
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